Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief

1. You are, of course, familiar with the story of Pierre. Raised in France, he acquires the name ‘Londres’ as a name of London. He accepts, in French of course, many claims about the city –elle est grande, jolie, dans Angleterre, etc., etc. 1 Spirited away to England, confined to an unpleasant part of London, forced to learn the language by speaking to the natives, he acquires ‘London’ as a name of London. He accepts, in English of course, many claims about the city –it is large, not at all pretty, in England, etc., etc. He does not recognize that the city he is in is the city, Londres, of which he learned in France. He remembers, and continues to accept in French, all the claims he learned in France about Londres –qu’elle est grande, jolie, dans Angleterre, etc.

Pierre’s experience in France warrants our saying that he believed that London is pretty. That, and the fact that he doesn’t seem to have changed his mind about what he learned in France, warrants our saying that he still believes that. Pierre’s experience in England warrants our saying that he believes that London is not pretty. This, Kripke claims, leads to a puzzle: “Does Pierre, or does he not believe that London is pretty? It is clear that our normal criteria for the attribution of belief lead, when applied to this question, to paradoxes and contradictions.”

How so? Why not say that poor Pierre has contradictory beliefs –that he believes that London is pretty, and that London is not pretty? The short answer is that Pierre is (to

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1 When I say that someone accepts the claim that so and such, in a particular language, I mean that: there’s a sentence S of the language which makes that claim; the person is related to S in a way that would normally warrant saying that he understood it; and because he accepts the sentence as true he has a belief he could express by uttering the sentence. Thus, for example, the text tells us that Pierre’s relations to his language warrant us in thinking that he understands the French sentence ‘Londres est grande, jolie, et dans Angleterre’ and, because he accepts this sentence as true, believes what he would say by uttering it.

This usage means that the inference Pierre accepts the claim that London is pretty; so, Pierre believes that London is pretty is not trivial. Obviously, the validity of the inference is closely related to the validity of the the Disquotational principle discussed below.

be supposed to be) rational and reflective. So if Pierre has these beliefs, we have a case of a rational and reflective person who has contradictory beliefs. But this is impossible: “…surely anyone…is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Precisely for this reason, we regard individuals who contradict themselves as subject to greater censure than those who merely have false beliefs.” (122)

It does indeed seem that we cannot imagine a sane person understanding and sincerely uttering a sentence of the form

(A) b is such and such, although b (the very same b) is also not such and such.

No sane person would think of the world in this way. And this suggests that we cannot imagine a sane person having beliefs that he would ascribe to himself with a sentence such as (A). Call such a situation –in which someone does have such beliefs, and has them because he thinks of the world in the way in which someone who would sincerely utter (A) thinks of it--a case of contradictory belief.³

Call a use of a sentence of the form

(B) a believes that b is such and such, and a believes that b is not such and such

in which we do not capitalize on any ambiguity or contextual shiftiness in b or such and such a case of ascribing inconsistent beliefs.⁴ One thinks that to ascribe inconsistent beliefs is to imply that the ascribee has contradictory beliefs. And if this is so –if saying that Pierre believes that London is pretty and he believes that it is not pretty implies that Pierre has contradictory belief --then Kripke is right: our normal criteria for ascribing belief lead to trouble in the case of Pierre. For a rational person could be in situation like

³ Perhaps you are wondering what exactly is meant by saying that someone thinks of things in the way in which someone who would sincerely utter (A) thinks of it. If you are, try to go with the flow until section 3.
⁴ Note that here and below, ‘a has contradictory beliefs’ and ‘[in uttering (B) we are saying that] a has inconsistent beliefs’ are used in the quasi-technical senses just assigned to them.
Pierre’s. Indeed, rational people often are in such situations.\(^5\) So there are possible – indeed actual – situations in which our normal criteria for ascribing belief lead us to say (things which imply) that there are cases in which rational people have contradictory beliefs. But we think it’s impossible that a rational person should have such beliefs.

2. Why should we care about Pierre? Kripke suggests that the way the puzzle about Pierre arises casts doubt on a standard argument against ‘Millianism’, the view that the semantic role of a proper name is exhausted by its being a name of whatever it names.

    Millianism seems to imply that names of one thing have the same semantic role; thus, it seems that (setting aside quotation and other contexts where a name’s shape or sound are invoked) if we accept Millianism, we must accept a principle of substitutivity:

    \[(S)\] If one sentence comes from another by replacing a proper name with a co-referential one, then (provided the sentences are relativized to the same context, and the names are not being quoted or the like) the sentences don’t differ in truth value.

A familiar objection to Millianism seizes on this apparent consequence of the view: Surely, the objection goes, someone rational could believe that, say, Twain wrote *Huck Finn* and that Clemens did not. If so, and \((S)\) is true, a rational person could believe that Twain wrote the book and believe that Twain didn’t.\(^6\) So a rational person could have contradictory beliefs. But a rational person can’t have such beliefs. So Millianism is false.

    What’s the connection with the puzzle about Pierre? Kripke’s idea is that what justifies us in thinking that someone might believe, that Twain wrote the book and that Clemens did not, is *au fond* the same set of principles – those which govern our

\(^5\) David Sosa, for example, tells us (in “The Import of Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief”, *Philosophical Review* 105, 1996, pp. 384) that for sometime he didn’t realize that realize that John Glenn the astronaut was the same person as John Glenn the Senator.

\(^6\) Of course the argument here relies on going back and forth, from an ascription of belief to an ascription of truth to such an ascription; such back and forth is taken to be justified by the obviousness of things like *Pierre believes that London is pretty* iff *‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ is true in English* (‘English’ here understood as naming the language of the sentence in which it occurs).
ascriptions of belief and other propositional attitudes—which justify us in thinking that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. So those principles all by themselves—quite apart from appeal to Millianism or a principle such as (S)—lead to the conclusion that a rational person might have contradictory beliefs. So it seems somewhat precipitate to object to Millianism in the way just rehearsed. For either we must reject the principles which underwrite the claim that someone might think Twain wrote a book but Clemens did not, or we must recant on our conviction, that rational people can’t have contradictory beliefs. Either way, the objection to Millianism is undermined.

3. As we are using ‘contradictory beliefs’, one has them when one believes of something that it is so and so, believes of it that it is not so and so, and has these beliefs because one thinks of the world in the way in which someone who accepts a sentence of the form a is F and a (the very same a) is not F thinks of it. I know that you would like an account of what I mean by ‘thinks of the world in the way in which someone who accepts sentence S’ does. I know I would like to give you an account. Sadly, I can’t find one. At least I can’t find one which will be neutral among all the views of belief and its objects which you, gentle readers, hold.

We could, of course, make things somewhat clearer if we adopted one or another of these views. A Fregean can cash out the notion of contradictory belief in terms of the “constituent senses” in the objects of the contradictory beliefs. Russell could have done something similar in terms of “propositional constituents”. Someone who thinks that propositional attitudes are realized by “representations”, and that such representations can be typed both semantically and in terms of properties that the thinker is sensitive to (so that we can speak of different token representations as being of “computationally identical” types) can cash the notion out in those terms. Noteworthy is that Frege, Russell, and the representationalist would all say that a thinker is sensitive to the identity and distinctness of the ways of thinking involved in her beliefs. Frege seemed to think

7 Or we must say that the truth of a sentence like (B)—that is, the truth of an ascription of inconsistent beliefs—doesn’t imply that anyone has contradictory beliefs. See the next section.
that when names have the same sense for a speaker, he accepts an identity involving them; Russell’s idea that we are acquainted with propositional constituents of our thoughts is apparently supposed to guarantee something like this; something similar is true of “synonymy in the language of thought”.

Probably no particular precisification of the notion of a way of thinking is uniquely determined by our pre-theoretic commitments about belief and other attitudes. But there is a commonsense notion of contradictory belief; there is commonsense talk of people thinking of objects in similar and dissimilar ways. And it is, I think, plausible to think that the first notion is to be explicated, as I have tried to explicate it, in terms of the second. If we take Kripke to have something like this notion in mind when he writes “…surely anyone…is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them”, then I think we must agree with him; and, I think, we must agree that such beliefs are a mark of irrationality. For having contradictory beliefs is a matter of being (relevantly like) someone who is disposed to sincerely think to himself ‘this is F and this (very same thing) is not F’. Since we can become aware of and evaluate such occurrent mental states, since a rational person is disposed to retract beliefs when he is aware of their impossibility, and since those who understand something with a meaning like that of the form a is F and a is not F are aware of its impossibility, someone who has contradictory beliefs is indeed in a position to become aware of them and correct them.

Does anyone who believes that Paris is pretty and that Paris is not pretty have contradictory beliefs?

One wants to tie belief in language users fairly closely to assent. Suppose that Jones understands the sentences he utters, that he is not given to deceiving others, and that he is not suffering from self-deception or kindred pathology. Then if he or we ask him ‘S?’ , and after reflection he assents, surely he believes what he or we say, when we utter the sentence S. Kripke’s version of this principle—one of the above mentioned principles governing attitude ascription—is the principle of disquotation

(D) If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’, then he believes that p.
This is a schema, ‘p’ to be replaced inside and outside of quotes with a sentence which “is to lack indexical or pronominal devices or ambiguities” (113). If we accept (D), we will also accept its analogs in other languages.⁸

Now, tense and the contextual shiftiness of ‘pretty’ set to the side as irrelevant, neither ‘London is not pretty’ nor ‘Londres est joile’ appear ambiguous or context sensitive in their languages. So given (D) it would appear that

(C1) Pierre believes that London is not pretty
(C2) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie

are true in their respective languages. The truth of (C1) in English implies that, indeed, Pierre believes that London is not pretty. And even a C+ student in second semester French can tell you what (C2) means—it means what ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ means—i.e., that Pierre believes that London is pretty. But sentences which, in their respective languages, mean the same thing, can’t differ in truth value in those languages. As Kripke puts it, we accept a principle of translation:

(T) If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that language). (114)

So, by appeal to what every mediocre student of French knows, Pierre believes that Paris is pretty.

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⁸Kripke also discusses a strengthened version of (D), in which assent to ‘p’ is said to imply and be implied by belief that p. Relatively little is made of this principle in Kripke’s essay and very little will be made of here. It will be clear by the end of this discussion that I think that the stronger principle is false. Anyone who thinks that we may believe what a sentence says although our understanding of the sentence is “imperfect” (in the way that, for example, the understanding of the sentence ‘I have arthritis’ in Tyler Burge’s well known example is imperfect) will be inclined to dismiss Kripke’s strengthened principle. (This because (a) one can believe what is said by sentences one only imperfectly understands, and (b) one could apparently have imperfect understanding of synonymous sentences which led one to reject one but not the other.) The example by Burge appears in “Individualism and the Mental”, in French, et. al, eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 73-121.
So the answer to our question seems to be ‘no’: Someone who, like Pierre, believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, need not have contradictory beliefs. Pierre, after all, does not have contradictory beliefs. He has, after all, no disposition whatsoever to assent to a sentence of the form \( a \text{ is } F, \text{ and } a \text{ – the very same } a \text{ – is not } F \). He does not think of the world in the way that someone who has such dispositions thinks of it. Though he is French, he is not crazy.

4. One feels something has gone seriously awry. If we accept the argument just given, we will conclude that Pierre believes that London is pretty and (that he believes that) London is not pretty. How can we then not say that Pierre has contradictory beliefs? Commonsense tells us that someone who believes that London is pretty and (that it) is not pretty is deranged. Surely Pierre’s irrationality is implied by saying that he so believes. Since he is not irrational, there must be something wrong with (D) or (T), or our translations from Pierre’s idiom into ours, or in some unmentioned bridge principle carrying us from the story of Pierre and these premises to the contrary conclusion.

It will help, in trying to determine whether we have gone off the rails, if we return to speaking of “the way in which someone thinks of the world” when they believe this or that. However we choose to make sense of this notion, we will surely take ways of thinking of the world to be “made up” of ways of thinking of the things which make the world up, as well as ways of thinking of the properties and relations these things have and bear. We will thus be able to talk about constituent relations amongst ways of thinking, as well as saying such things as: When \( a \) thinks that \( b \) is \( F \) and \( c \) thinks that \( b \) is \( G \), they think of \( b \) in the same way, though when \( d \) thinks that \( b \) is \( F \), he thinks of \( b \) in some other way. In particular, we will be able to say things like:

(E1) In thinking that London is pretty (as he does when he says ‘Londres est jolie’), Pierre thinks of London in the same way as he does when (saying ‘London is not pretty’) he thinks that London is not pretty.
(E2) In thinking that London is pretty (as he does when he says ‘Londres est jolie’), Pierre thinks of London in a different way than he does when (saying ‘London is not pretty’) he thinks that London is not pretty.

Presumably, Pierre is irrational only if something along the lines of (E1) is true.

The suggestion is that our notion of contradictory belief as something irrational (irrational, in part, because it is something that a responsible and reflective thinker can be aware of as a matter of course) presupposes that when one has a belief (or other propositional attitude) with a particular content, associated with the belief are “ways of thinking” of the objects and properties the belief is about; these ways of thinking determine, or at least reflect, the thinker’s “access to the content of the belief”. By this I mean (for example) that if A’s beliefs that b is F and that b is G involve the same way of thinking about b, then A takes those beliefs to present a single individual as being F and G. If all this is so, then whether a belief is irrational will be (in large part) determined by the ways of thinking it involves. After all, if (E1) were true, then given what we just said about ways of thinking, Pierre takes those beliefs to present a single individual as both pretty and not pretty. But part of rationality is being disposed to withdraw at least some of any set of beliefs with this property.

The suggestion, then, is that the irrationality of a belief is a matter of relations amongst the ways of thinking involved in the belief. In particular, the irrationality of a belief one would self-ascribe with a sentence of the form of (A) is a matter of its involving thinking of an individual with a single way of thinking as both having and lacking a property. Suppose that the suggestion is correct. And now suppose further that when we ascribe beliefs and use an expression e several times, re-occurrence of e in the ascription implies identity of ways of thinking involved in the attitudes ascribed. Suppose, for example, that if we say Pierre believes that London is blah blah, and that London is blee blee, we imply that there is a way of thinking of London such that, thinking of London in that way, Pierre thinks both that it is blah blah and blee blee. Then an ascription of inconsistent beliefs does indeed imply that the ascribee has contradictory beliefs.
We began this section wondering how to reconcile our feeling—that to say that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that it is not pretty is to imply that he has contradictory beliefs—with the observations that belief ascription seems to be governed by (D) and (T), and that if a practice is so governed then to say that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that it is not pretty is not to imply that he has contradictory beliefs. We have in effect offered an explanation of the first mentioned feeling, by linking the notion of contradictory belief to the notion of a way of thinking, and by saying that our practice of ascribing beliefs is governed by a principle along the lines of

(R) Multiple occurrences of an expression within ascriptions of attitude to a single person indicate that the attitudes involve multiple occurrences of a single way of thinking in the attitudes ascribed.

Given that (D), (T), our ordinary practices of translation, and (R) govern our practices of ascribing attitudes, and given that our notion of contradictory belief reflects the ideas about ways of thinking and irrationality just sketched, we have an explanation of both our feeling that Pierre must have contradictory beliefs, and our feeling that, obviously, he does not.

The explanation is, of course, only as good as our evidence for (R). It seems to me that it is not hard to garner evidence for this principle. Consider, for example, explanations of behavior by ascription of attitudes, such as

(F) Mary hit Twain because she wanted to humiliate him, and she thought that if she hit him, she would humiliate him.

We take these to be potentially explanatory. Notably, we do not have the same attitude towards ascriptions in which different names of a single individual occur. While, for example, we find (F) or

(F’) Mary hit Twain because she wanted to humiliate Twain, and she thought that if she hit Twain, she would humiliate Twain
to be explanatory without supplement, we do not feel that way about

(F”) Mary hit Twain because she wanted to humiliate Twain, and she thought that if she hit Clemens, she would humiliate Clemens.

What, after all, if Mary didn’t know that Twain was Clemens? (F”) as an explanation is just bizarre without supplement. (R) explains both why (F’) should be explanatory, as well as why (F”) needs supplementation before it is explanatory.

5. With studied vagueness, I have said that (D), (T), and (R) “govern” our practices of ascribing attitudes. But what does that mean? Are (D) and (T) supposed to be true, full stop, so that it is true, full stop, that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that it is not? Or are they rules which tell us something about when we are, ceteris paribus, warranted in saying that someone has a certain belief? For that matter, what exactly is (R) supposed to mean? Is ‘indicate’ in (R) to be understood as involving some semantical rule, or some defeasible pragmatic signal?

What can be said in favor of the thought that (D) and (T) (with (T) informed by our normal practices of translation) are true full stop? Well, they do have the air of trivialities. One way to come to believe something is by considering its verbal expression and, understanding what one is doing, assenting to it. If Pierre asks himself, having been in England for three years, ‘Is this place pretty?’, and looking around says with disgust ‘Hell no’, what good reason can be given for saying that he is not expressing what he thinks? And how, if he understands what he is saying, can he not be expressing the claim that London is not pretty? As for (T), it apparently follows from the absolutely trivial

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9 For further discussion of these issues, see my “Propositional Attitude Ascriptions” in Devitt and Hanley, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 2005).
claims that (a) translation preserves meaning, and (b) meaning determines truth (i.e., sentences which mean the same thing must have the same truth values). 10

What can be said against (D)? The most likely objection to (D) is that it combines a relatively benign idea about belief with controversial – some would say obnoxious – ideas about language identity. What, it might be asked, is the import of the phrase ‘normal English speaker’ in (D)? Are we to suppose that there is a some one language all of us “English speakers” speak? That is, are we to suppose that there is some one set of syntactic, phonetic, and semantic principles which correctly describe “the” language being spoken by everyone who has (say) received passing grades in American high school English? Chomsky tells us that to think this is to confuse politics and linguistics. 11

Certainly it is true that the syntactic and phonetic description of my language will be different from the description of the language of others, assuming that such description is supposed to generate the sentences I produce when I am not tired, misspeaking, being linguistically creative, etc. After all, you say toe-may-toe, and I say toe-ma-toe. Suppose we allow that this shows that language is idiosyncratic, so that strictly speaking no two people speak the same language. Once we allow that when Pierre is “speaking English” he may not be speaking a language with the same semantics as the language in which we speak when we formulate (D), (D) seems either implausible or too weak to yield the conclusions it is supposed to yield. For suppose that Pierre’s spoken language – PL, call it –– is not the same as my spoken language – call it ML. How are we to understand an instance of (D) such as

(D1) If Pierre, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘London is not pretty’, then he believes that London is not pretty?

10 Of course meaning doesn’t determine truth simpliciter. ‘I am sad’ in English means the same as ‘je suis triste’ in French, but while the first is false when I use it, the second is true when Pierre uses it. The correct principle is something along the lines of sentences with the same meaning taken relative to the same (or relevantly similar) context(s) have the same truth value. Since we are supposed to be concerned only with expressions which aren’t context sensitive, such as ‘London’, Kripke presumably thought it was acceptable to simplify the principle of translation.

I return to the issues raised in this note in the last sections of this discussion.

11 This claim appears repeatedly in Chomsky’s writings. See, for example, Rules and Representations, (Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 117-20.
If I utter (D1), my utterance is an utterance of a sentence of my language, ML. But both ML and PL contain a sentence which looks like ‘London is not pretty’. Which one does (D1)’s quotation name name? That is, should we understand (D1) as

(D1.1) If Pierre, on reflection, sincerely assents to the PL sentence ‘London is not pretty’, then he believes that London is not pretty,

or as

(D1.2) If Pierre, on reflection, sincerely assents to the ML sentence ‘London is not pretty’, then he believes that London is not pretty?

We have, it might be urged, no reason to think that (D1.1) is true. Since ML and PL are different languages, ‘London is not pretty’ may mean different things in them. When Pierre sincerely assents to ‘London is pretty’ he is, we may assume, expressing a belief in what this string says in PL. But since the string may mean one thing in PL, another in ML, this fact doesn’t give us reason to think that Pierre believes that London is not pretty –i.e., it doesn’t give us reason to think that the ML predicate ‘believes that London is not pretty’ is true of Pierre. On the other hand, it is not clear what to make of Pierre’s assent to the ML sentence ‘London is not pretty’. Presumably he has not made the theoretical judgment that his language and my language are distinct, so it has not even occurred to him that he is assenting to something which is not a sentence of his language. He may, when he assents, be indicating belief, but there is not reason to think that he is indicating belief in what the relevant string says in my language. After all, he understands the utterance as he understands his own utterances. So once again, we have no reason to think that the principle is true.

So I imagine someone objecting to (D). Note that someone who so objects to (D) need not be objecting to the idea that assent indicates belief. Indeed, we can imagine someone who objects to (D) in this way allowing that certain “first person variants” of (D) are perfectly acceptable. What I have in mind is something along the lines of
(D2) Pierre’s uses (in the language he speaks in London) of ‘If I, Pierre, on reflection, sincerely assent to ‘p’, where ‘p’ is a sentence of my language, then I, Pierre, believe that p’ are true in the language Pierre speaks in London.

This, like (D), is a schema in which ‘p’ is to be replaced by a non-ambiguous, non-contextually sensitive sentence. Given that Pierre’s language has a disquotational truth predicate and a normal logic, it follows that if Pierre assents, on reflection, to ‘London is not pretty’, then Pierre can, speaking his London language, say truthfully.

(P) I, Pierre, believe that London is not pretty.

French analogues of (D2) establish that Pierre can, speaking his Parisean language, say truthfully

(P’) Je, Pierre, croit que Londres est jolie.

We can use (T) and our normal practices of translation to go on to derive the conclusions that Kripke finds so puzzling.

Whether we accept the Chomskyean objection to (D) or not –I will take that objection up in the next section –the derivation of Kripke’s puzzle just sketched is worth contemplating. For instances of schemata like (D2) certainly do seem plausible. What (D2) captures is the idea that whatever it is that Pierre is saying, when he sincerely assents to a sentence of his language, it is something he believes. It is hard to see how this idea could fail to be correct. And as just indicated, it seems that we need only it, our usual practices of translation (including our practice of homophonic “translation”), and (T) to generate the conclusion, that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that it is not pretty. If we think this conclusion cannot be correct, it seems, we must lay the blame at the feet of (T) or our practices of translation.
6. It is easy to see why someone might be moved to say that phonetics and syntax differ enough to make it implausible that we English speakers all speak a single language. That doesn’t imply that our normal practices of translation (including our practice of homophonic translation) don’t preserve meaning.

We think we all mean the same by ‘London is pretty’; we think that the way to translate any normal Frenchman’s use of ‘Londres est jolie’ is with ‘London is pretty’. Why? Well, the fact is that we understand one another, and our translating the French in the conventional way allows us to understand them. By saying that we understand each other, I mean (roughly) that we are able to make sense of each other’s verbal behavior (in the context of each other’s behavior as a whole), and we do this in a non-accidental way (that is, if interpreter and interpretee proceed in the ways they have been proceeding, our understanding will continue). It is hard to see this understanding as not based in the presupposition that (ambiguity and context sensitivity to the side, and speaking now schematically and for myself) when you utter ‘p’, you are saying p. These facts –that we undeniably understand one another, and that our understanding seems to be grounded in the assumption that we say the same things with our sentences –provide one route to the idea that we mean the same thing with these sentences. And of course this idea underwrites the idea that our sentences homophonically translate each other.¹²

One might respond by pointing out –correctly –that we have very different concepts of the things to which we refer. Often, our concepts are different enough that – save for the fact that we label them with the same public language word --we would never think that they were concepts of the same thing or property. And this, the response concludes, shows that we can’t really mean the same thing by our words.

It is hard –for me, at least –to take this response seriously. If successful linguistic interpretation can (and often does) proceed despite the fact that very different mental structures are associated with our words, that simply shows that those mental structures

¹² Some of a Davidsonian bent would say that the facts –that we make sense of each other, that we do this by translating homophonically –simply entail that we mean the same thing by our sentences; there is, they would say, nothing more to same-meaning. Others who yet like to visit the museum of a Sunday afternoon see no entailment here. We can side step this dispute. For only a jejune skeptic would say, in the face of our ability to make sense of each, that we do not understand each other.
do not have be identical (or even very much the same) in order for us to successfully interpret. And since we understand one another when we successfully (and non-accidently) interpret each other, this shows that the mental structures in question need not be very much the same in order for us to understand each other. As I see it, non-accidental homophonic interpretation is a sign that interpreter and interpretee mean the same things by their words. What more evidence could we possibly demand?

Now, the argument I have been giving could well be taken as an argument for an analogue of Kripke’s disquotational principle (D):

\[(N) \text{ If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely (and without irony) utters ‘p’, then he (sincerely) says that } p.\]

The argument is, put simply, that using (N) allows us to make sense of each other; it wouldn’t do so if it weren’t true. It is noteworthy that a perfectly similar argument seems to be possible for (D). After all, to make sense of one another requires knowing not just what we say, but what we think. And we determine this, in good part, by interpreting one another’s speech and (assuming that the speech is sincere) ascribing belief in what is said. That is, we assume

\[(O) \text{ If a normal English speaker sincerely says } p, \text{ he believes that } p.\]

(N) and (O), nearly enough, entail (D).

I will return, at the end of this essay, to the status of principles such as (N), (O), and (D).

7. Let us take stock. We have isolated a sense of ‘contradictory belief’ in which no rational person has contradictory beliefs. We have observed that we have reason to think

\[13\text{ (N) is, of course, subject to the same sort of caveats, concerning substitutends for ‘p’, as is (D). It requires other caveats for cases in which sincere, non-ironic speech is not assertive which I won’t try to formulate.}\]
that our ordinary practices of translation preserve meaning. We have noted that the principle (T) Kripke invokes, to the effect that translation preserves truth, seems absolutely banal. And we have observed that (a) our reasons for thinking that our ordinary practices of translation preserve meaning are in fact reasons for accepting Kripke’s disquotation principle (D), and (b) even if we reject (D), far weaker and seemingly undeniable principles are sufficient, once the other things just mentioned are in place, for deriving the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty, and that it is not pretty.

It is beginning to look as if what we should do is understand (R) in such a way that while

(G) Pierre believes that London is pretty and that it is not pretty

implies that Pierre has contradictory beliefs, the implication falls short of entailment. We are familiar enough with the idea that we may imply something without actually saying it. One conclusion to draw from Kripke’s essay is that (G) does not entail that Pierre is irrational. If we do draw this conclusion, we may well go on to conclude that the semantics of attitude ascription is Millian through and through.

Some have drawn these conclusions; some have contested them.\(^\text{14}\) I don’t propose to rehearse past arguments. I will observe that the last conclusion –implying as it does that if Mary believes that Twain wrote 1609, she believes that Clemens wrote it --is somewhat fantastic.

It is fantastic because it is so at variance with our understanding of our talk about our attitudes. We presuppose that the syntax of the content sentences of attitude ascriptions reflects properties of the mental states ascribed. We assume, for example, that if Mary believes that if p, then q, and she wants q, she has some inclination to make it the case that p; it goes without saying that if Marty thinks that if p, then q, but is pretty sure

\(^{14}\) Keith Donnellan is an example of someone who reads Kripke as providing a good argument for Millianism; see “Belief and the Identity of Reference” in French, et.al., eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIV (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). Sosa, op. cit., resists the conclusion.
that it’s not the case that q, he will be pretty sure that it isn’t the case that p, either\textsuperscript{15}. We not only assume that the attitudes are (Freudian and such forces set to the side) under rational control and are motivational; we assume that our way of ascribing them invokes the properties which make the attitudes subject to rational review and motivational. The properties we are invoking in such ascriptions, if the semantics of those ascriptions are Millian through and through, are not properties in virtue of which the attitudes are motivational or transparent to reason.\textsuperscript{16} What is in my opinion completely fantastic in the thought that attitude ascriptions have a Millian semantics is the idea that the meaning of talk about the attitudes could be this far out of whack with its purpose and use. Only someone in the grip of a philosophical theory could think that what we mean and what we do with our words was this disconnected.

This leaves us with the intermediate conclusion, that (R) is to be understood so that (G) does not entail that Pierre’s beliefs are contradictory. If we accept this conclusion—and by the end of the essay, we shall—we need some explanation of how we can draw this conclusion but avoid drawing a Millian conclusion from the puzzle about Pierre.

8. One reaction to Kripke’s essay—a reaction that the last few sections may tend to reinforce—is that Kripke has uncovered a genuine puzzle; but it is really a puzzle about belief ascription, not a puzzle about belief. The puzzle just posed—how can (G) be true if Pierre doesn’t have contradictory beliefs?—is a puzzle about our talk about Pierre. And, in any case, it might be said, it is clear enough what Pierre believes: He believes that London—that is, the city of which he heard in France, called ‘Londres’—is pretty, and that London—that is, the city in which he currently finds himself, whose inhabitants call it ‘London’—is not pretty. What is puzzling is not what Pierre believes (which is perfectly consistent), but how to say what he believes in the idiom for belief ascription provided by

\textsuperscript{15} Kripke emphasizes this in discussing the puzzle at p. 122.

\textsuperscript{16} Argument for this claim can be found in “Propositional Attitude Ascriptions”, op. cit.
English, if we limit ourselves to identifying the object of his beliefs with the name ‘London’.¹⁷

Kripke anticipates this reaction towards the end of ‘A Puzzle about Belief’. According to Kripke, one can’t get rid of the puzzle simply by saying that Pierre associates different identifying properties with ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ (and thus his beliefs are “really” consistent), since “the puzzle can arise even if Pierre associates exactly the same identifying properties with both names.” (125) After all, Pierre might “define” ‘Londres’ as ‘la capitale d’Angleterre’ and “define” ‘London’ as ‘the capital of England’. If he did, and we individuate his beliefs in terms of the objects, properties, and relations they are about, we will conclude that he expresses exactly the same belief with ‘London is pretty’ as he does with ‘Londres est jolie’.

One way to put Kripke’s point is this. If Pierre “associates the same identifying properties” with the names, then the way he thinks of London when he speaks French is *the same* as the way he thinks of it when he speaks English. And this is quite puzzling apart from any issue about how we might ascribe Pierre’s beliefs: How can Pierre be rational, if thinking of London in one way (as England’s capital) he thinks it pretty, while thinking of it in the *same way*, he thinks it not pretty?

It will be objected that if Pierre “defines” the names in this way, he must associate different properties with the English and French names of Britian.¹⁸ But why is this? We

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¹⁷ There are a family of proposals along these lines. The simplest ones insist that all belief (or all belief save that about the self, or save that about the self and the present moment) is descriptive. Others take the modal profile of all beliefs (or all beliefs save those about the self, or save those about the self and the present moment) to be explained in terms of David Lewis’ counterpart relations. Natural ways of fleshing *this* out render Pierre’s “French beliefs” consistent with his “English beliefs” because different counterpart relations are used to interpret Pierre’s “French thought” and his “English thought”. (Something like this is suggested in Lewis’ “What Puzzling Pierre does not Believe”, in Lewis, *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 408-417. Lewis’ own proposal is complicated by the suggestion that there are two ways to interpret someone, “narrowly” (using a counterpart relation) and “widely”.)

What follows is meant to be responsive to all such proposals. (In the case of Lewis’ proposal, let me add somewhat cryptically that the primary problem with it is that it is inconsistent with the idea that what motivates us has the semantics of the language in which we report what motivates us –it is, if you like, inconsistent with the idea that what we say is what we think.)
come to know individuals “under guises”, and can fail to recognize an individual from encounter to encounter because we do not take the guises under which he appears to be guises of one individual. Why shouldn’t this be true of properties and relations as well? One might respond that properties and relations are different: if being F just is being G, one just can’t know what it is to be F, know what it is to be G, but mistakenly think that being F isn’t being G.

This seems desperate. It requires us to find meanings for ‘capital of England’ and ‘capitale d’Angleterre’ as used by Pierre which characterize the city in terms of different properties. Are we to suppose that Pierre’s utterance of ‘Londres est jolie’ means something along the lines of the capital of the country the French call ‘Angleterre’ is pretty, or, London, which is the capital of the country my countymen call ‘Angleterre,’ is pretty? Then we are being asked to simply reject all the lessons, about the modal profile of a sentence involving names, which we learned on reading Naming and Necessity. Are we supposed to divorce what our sentences mean from the beliefs we express with them, saying with Russell that (since we must have an intimate epistemic relation to something before we can have a belief about it) there is a judgment about London which we should like to make (one which is expressed by our sentence ‘London is pretty’!), but which, when we try to make it, we are “necessarily defeated, since the actual [London] is unknown to us”? As Kripke observes, saying this leads to saying that no two people (or person at different times) mean the same thing—at least, express the same beliefs—with their sentences. As Stephen Schiffer once said, “believe it if you can.”

If one thinks of a way of thinking as something to be identified with, or at least individuated in terms of, a collection of objects, properties, and relations, the puzzles Kripke presents us with are indeed difficult to solve. If one thinks of thought in the way that Russell did, it is hard to know how else to think of a way of thinking. A—perhaps the—standard way of thinking of Frege’s notion of the sense of a name thinks of senses in

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18 Thus Sosa at p.397.
19 “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, most easily accessible in Salmon and Soames, op. cit., p. 22.
20 Sosa, who thinks that Pierre’s uses of ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ must have different meanings, seems prepared to endorse this conclusion at Sosa, op. cit., p. 398.
The proper conclusion to draw, it seems to me, is that what I have been calling ways of thinking are not to be individuated (simply) in terms of objects, properties, and relations. Whether two expressions (as used by a particular individual) are associated with the same way of thinking is not a matter of their semantic properties (where these are individuated in terms of the expressions’ conventional potentials for referring or applying to objects). It is a matter of their cognitive properties, properties reflected by such facts as whether (if the expressions are terms) the user accepts or is disposed to accept the relevant identity. This sort of fact is (of course) relevant to whether the person has contradictory beliefs, and to the issues raised by Kripke’s puzzle.

9. Kripke’s puzzle is a puzzle about belief. But it turns a puzzle about translation: Can we, or can we not, translate Pierre’s use of ‘Londres est jolie’ with our use (or Pierre’s, for that matter) of ‘London is pretty’?

There are at least two projects we may undertake which could be called ‘interpretation’ or ‘translation’. One is finding a projectable way of going from someone’s utterances (inscriptions and even occurrent linguistic mental events) to (potential) utterances (inscriptions, and occurrent mental events) of our own, a way of doing this which allows us to understand the other’s language. Armed with such, we would be in a position to say things like “Pierre’s utterance of ‘London is pretty’ means that London is pretty”, or “Pierre’s use of ‘je ne pense pas que Roubaix est le sud de Lille’, meant that he doesn’t think that Roubaix is south of Lille.” A second project is finding a way of getting from the other’s utterances (inscriptions, occurrent mental events), behavior, and general position in the world to a characterization of what he thinks, wants, says, and so forth –and thus, to a position in which we can say things like ‘Pierre thinks that London is pretty’, or ‘Pierre wishes that Roubaix were south of Lille’. Call the first project linguistic interpretation, the second individual interpretation.

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21 This understanding arises, I think, because of Frege’s habit of using different co-designating descriptions to provide examples of different senses which present the same object, along with the assumption that predicate senses, as public but Platonic entities, must be the sort of thing Russell had in mind in speaking of universals. I am frankly uncertain whether this is the proper way to understand Frege.
These are not completely separate projects, of course. But it is worth insisting that they are separate projects, and are typically subject to differing constraints.\textsuperscript{22} Linguistic interpretation is, and must be, done at the wholesale (not the retail) level: it is impossible to start anew with each individual and puzzle out what their words mean. What we do –do because we have learned to do it and expect one another to do it --is impose a single scheme of interpretation on those around us, tinkering at the edges when it seems advisable. The scheme we impose, of course, is usually the scheme we were taught to impose, when we were “taught the ambient language.” Wholesale imposition of such a scheme on one another allows us to understand one another in large part because our wholesale mutual imposition of (and acquiescence in) a uniform scheme of interpretation helps make it the case that we all mean the same thing with our words. The point of our all behaving as if we speak the same language is that our behaving in this way pretty much guarantees that we do have a common language. Our so behaving thus helps to insure that linguistic interpretation can pretty much proceed on automatic pilot.

Linguistic interpretation is not exactly Millian, but it is, or at least is usually, pretty close. How, after all, could it help but be? Our talk is about objects, their properties, and their relations; we care very much what others say and think about them. We care enough about this that we demand that interpretation preserve reference and satisfaction conditions. And beyond reference and satisfaction conditions, there just isn’t that much that linguistic interpretation can preserve. It is, as Kripke notes, pretty rare for a word like a name to have a community wide connotation (108), and so it is for the most part impossible for translation to preserve such. Ways of thinking are so idiosyncratic, for the most part, that requiring translation to preserve them would bring the enterprise to a grinding halt.\textsuperscript{23} A (more or less) Millian scheme of linguistic interpretation seems like a good place –pretty much the only place --to start, if we are looking for a way to interpret those in the environs.

\textsuperscript{22} Davidson’s use of the idea of radical interpretation as an account of linguistic interpretation is unfortunate in that it blurs the fact that linguistic and individual interpretation are quite different projects.

\textsuperscript{23} Our ways of thinking are, of course, also typically unknown to others, so that even if they were shared, our ignorance of them would –if we need to preserve them to linguistically interpret –bring linguistic interpretation to a standstill.
But when I want to know what someone thinks, wants, and hopes—when I want to interpret an individual—something more than this is called for. To know the attitudes of another is to be in a position to understand how those attitudes motivate him, to know “how the world seems” to him. If I am to come to know these things by interpreting the other’s utterances and behavior in my own idiom, that interpretation needs to reflect more than just what objects, properties, and relations he refers to or thinks about. After all, if only that were reflected in individual interpretation, such interpretation could not distinguish between someone who had contradictory beliefs (believing that, say, Twain is dead and Twain—the very same Twain—is not dead), and someone whose beliefs were inconsistent but not contradictory (as are those of one who thinks that Twain, but not Clemens, is dead).

Over and above correctly capturing the reference of another’s words, what seems necessary (and in practice seems to be all we can reasonably be expected to achieve) for individual interpretation is that we capture the overall structure of the way in which they think about the world—capture the identity and difference of their ways of thinking of things and properties, as those ways of thinking are deployed in their hopes, knowledge, desires, and dreams. If, for example, the other’s use of sentences $S$ and $S’$ involve the same (different) way(s) of thinking of an individual, that is to be reflected in our interpretation of those uses. Of course, the natural way to achieve this is for our account, of what another believes, wants, and so on, to satisfy a principle like (R). It is easy enough to see how one attempts to satisfy such a principle: One surmises when utterances (or actions expressive of an attitude) involve the same way of thinking of an individual, when they involve different ways of thinking thereof; one tries to preserve such sameness and difference in interpretation, assigning to each way of thinking its own linguistic representation. Of course, that may not always be possible, at least not without introduction of neologisms—as when one says, of a person who thinks that Paderweski the politician and Paderewski the musician are distinct, that they do not realize that Paderweski the politician is Paderweski the musician.

David Braun suggested to me that Kripke’s example of Peter (who accepts ‘Pederweski was a musician’ and ‘Pederweski wasn’t a musician’) casts doubt on the claim at the beginning of this section, that Kripke’s puzzle turns on a puzzle about translation. I
Linguistic interpretation is something one does (so far as is possible) in advance. Individual interpretation is much more a one off affair. This is, of course, partially a matter of its being (more nearly) possible to know in advance, and independently of much interaction with another, what her words and gestures mean, than it is to know which of those words or gestures express beliefs. But individual interpretation is also one off simply because there is no one way to do it. This is not (or not just) because (for Quinean reasons) there is semantic indeterminancy. Rather, it is because there will be, when the other is confused or ignorant, more than one way to limn the structure, of his picture of the world, which is determined by the ways he thinks of its objects.

Linguistic interpretation is something we can (almost) always pull off, if only because we work so hard (all of us going to school and “learning the same language”) to be in a position to be able to (effortlessly) pull it off. Individual interpretation is something we cannot always do—or cannot always do limited to the resources at hand. In the case of Pierre, for example, we are hamstrung: His way of looking at the world has a structure not reflected in the vocabulary we have to describe it. He has two ways of thinking of a thing for which we have but one name.

This section began with a question about translation: Can we, or can we not, translate Pierre’s use of ‘Londres est jolie’ with our use (or Pierre’s, for that matter) of disagree. What is puzzling about the man who doesn’t realize that Pederweski the musician is Pederweski the politician is—I would say—that the meaning of ‘Pederweski was a musician, but Pederweski wasn’t a musician’—the linguistic meaning of the sentence—as he uses it is the same as the meaning—the linguistic meaning—of the sentence as we use it. Ditto, for ‘Peter believes that Pederweski is a pianist, but Pederweski is not a pianist’. But when the confused man (sincerely) utters the first sentence, he doesn’t express a contradictory belief, while we would do so if we uttered it. And while it is no big thing for the man to use the second sentence in a way that doesn’t imply that Peter has contradictory beliefs, it is difficult indeed for us to do this. What is puzzling, that is, is how these sentences could mean the same as Peter and we use them—how one could translate the other—but have such different properties when came to what mental states they express and what the implications of using them in ascribing such states are.

The problem here, as in the case of Pierre, is one which arises because of identity of linguistic meaning is not a reliable guide to identity of belief expressed, even given that we are looking at someone who understands the sentences in question (and so “knows what they mean”). That is, the problem arises because (given the identity of linguistic meaning) we can translate the other’s idiom into ours, but that translation doesn’t allow us to interpret (in the sense of the text) the other.
‘London is pretty’? The suggestion just made is that the question can be taken in two ways, as a question about linguistic interpretation, or as one about individual interpretation. We can give a linguistic translation of Pierre’s utterances. We can also give a piecemeal individual interpretation of Pierre’s utterances as expressive of what he believes. We can, after all, focus simply on his “French beliefs”, ignoring his English ones. And then we can pretty much preserve what needs preserving, in the way the world looks to Pierre, by using a linguistic translation of those utterances. We can do the same thing should we focus solely on his “English beliefs”. What we can’t do—at least not without making use of an idiom whose syntactic resources reflect the structure of Pierre’s conceptual system—is give an interpretation of all of his beliefs at once.

10. The linguistic interpretation—the translation, if you will—of Pierre’s sentence ‘Londres est jolie’ is ‘London is pretty’. We do not have to know very much about Pierre, beyond the fact that he speaks French, to know that. The linguistic interpretation of ‘Pierre croit que Londres est jolie’ is ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’. This we know, as it were, once and for all, and not one off.

When Pierre sincerely says ‘Londres est jolie’, he knows that he is expressing a belief; he knows how to interpret himself: je croit que Londres est jolie. Can I interpret him by saying that he believes that London is pretty? That all depends. It depends, in particular, on what I have already done in the way of interpreting him. If I have been discussing the beliefs he is wont to express in English about London, I will most probably have been using sentences in which the word ‘London’ occurs, saying that Pierre is convinced that London is not is pretty. I cannot then just turn around and say that he believes that London is pretty; at the very least, some contextualization of such a claim is needed.

This may seem weird. Given the facts about linguistic interpretation—about translation—how can there be any doubt about whether I can interpret Pierre’s ‘je croit que Londres est jolie’ with ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’? The two sentences mean the same thing, for goodness sake.
Indeed. But whether I can describe another’s beliefs in a particular way very much depends upon the context of description. My descriptions of others’ beliefs –my ascriptions thereof –are sensitive to the context in which they are made. And as we all know, when a sentence is context sensitive, its truth in one context does not assure its truth in others. Likewise, there is no guarantee that the translation of a context sensitive sentence will, in the context of translation, have the truth value of the translated sentence in the context from which it is translated. The two sentences ‘Pierre croit que Londres est jolie’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ mean the same thing. So do the sentences ‘je suis fatigue’ and ‘I’m tired’. But one wouldn’t infer from this synonymy that when Pierre says ‘[je crois que] je suis fatigue’, I can interpret him as saying ‘[Pierre thinks that] I’m tired’.

The banal principle (T) is of course subject to qualification: If S translates as T from your language to mine, and S is true as you use it, T will be true as I use it if S (and T) are free of context sensitive vocabulary. I suspect that Kripke, in framing (T), thought that such qualification was unnecessary. He was, after all, concerned with sentences like ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and its French translate; tense aside, he probably thought, there is nothing context sensitive in such sentences. As I see it, Kripke’s puzzle arises, in part, because such sentences are contextually sensitive in the way I have been suggesting. Given the sort of contextual sensitivity I am suggesting they have, given someone suffering from the sort of confusion from which poor, poor Pierre suffers, and given the lack of multiple words for London in English, we are in a bit of a pickle, when we try to answer the question, Does he, or does he not, believe that London is pretty?25

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Let us take stock. Schematic principles such as

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25 At this point, one wants to hear a story about the precise nature of the context sensitivity I allege for sentences like ‘Pierre believes that Paris is pretty’. Different authors will tell different stories here, and an essay on Kripke’s essay is not the place for that literature review. A reader interested in my own views of the matter might look at the close of “Propositional Attitude Ascriptions”, op. cit.
(D2) Pierre’s uses (in the language he speaks in London) of instances of ‘If I, Pierre, on reflection, sincerely assent to ‘p’, where ‘p’ is a sentence of my language, then I, Pierre, believe that p’ are surely true. Since the instances involve context sensitive vocabulary, we are not guaranteed that our uses of (trivial modifications of) them (which cast those instances in the third person) will also be true. Uses of instances of (D), the schematic, third person ancestor of (D2), are perhaps invariably true when taken relative to contexts in which no substantive interpretation has already occurred. We can reliably begin interpreting another by using the linguistic interpretation of his speech. If, however, he suffers from some sort of confusion (which may become manifest when we look at linguistic translations of his speech), we may not be able to completely interpret him via linguistic translation.

Construed as principles about linguistic interpretation and suitably qualified, principles such as (T) are banal truths. But they do not yield puzzling or paradoxical consequences about Pierre’s beliefs. Indeed, given the ubiquity of context dependence in natural language – is there, for example, a comparative adjective which is not context dependent? – there is very little which a suitably qualified version of (T) tells us. The principle

(R) Multiple occurrences of an expression within ascriptions of attitude to a single person indicate that the attitudes involve multiple occurrences of a single way of thinking in the attitudes ascribed

seems (to me) to tell us something important about how we ascribe attitudes to others. It is, in my opinion, in part because something along the lines of (R) is true that we find Kripke’s puzzle genuinely puzzling. (R) is craftily phrased (‘indicate’) so that it can be taken as a principle about the semantics of attitude ascription, or as one about its “pragmatics”; only those who take it to be a semantic principle are likely to be moved by the argument of the last two sections, that what Kripke’s puzzle shows us is that interpreting others by assigning them beliefs is a contextually sensitive affair. I hope that
even those who reject this will at least assent to the pragmatic version of (R), and the
-diagnosis of the Kripke’s puzzle that I’ve offered.

Do we say, when we say ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Pierre
believes that London is not pretty’ that Pierre’s beliefs are contradictory? Since the
language we use to ascribe belief is context sensitive, there need be no unequivocal
answer to this question. It would not be surprising, I think, to discover that the answer
was that it depends: a normal use of this would entail that he had contradictory beliefs,
but unusual uses of this –ones in a special context in which our interests are simply to
convey the truth conditions of various pieces of Pierre’s unfortunate mental landscape –
may not have such an entailment.26

“Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that London is pretty?” If there were a
Pierre, and someone asked such a question about him –in the course of an everyday,
“non-philosophical” conversation, with interests of a more or less normal sort –the
question might well have a straightforward answer. What that answer would be would
depend on the situation in which the question was asked, the interests and focus of
conversants, what had been said already and what was presupposed. If the question were
asked when our philosophical noses were being rubbed in the sordid details of Pierre’s
intellectual history, the question probably wouldn’t have a straightforward answer. That
doesn’t seem terribly problematic to me –lots of questions don’t have a straightforward
answer.27

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26 This is my own view of the matter. I take (R) to be a rule of thumb about the truth
conditions of ascriptions of attitude. Normally, ascriptions of attitude to an individual
will be true only if the identity and difference of vocabulary in the ascriptions faithfully
reflects identity and difference among ways of thinking involved in the attitudes ascribed.
But (R) is a rule of thumb, and when pressure is put upon it, by a case like that of
Pierre’s, it may be broken. Again, the interested (or puzzled) reader can look at
‘Propositional Attitude Ascriptions’.

27 Thanks to David Braun for comments. And thanks to Saul Kripke, for providing a
model of how philosophy can be rigorous and accessible, genuinely significant and still fun.