A dozen or so years ago, most analytic philosophers would have found the following picture self-evident: Much, though by no means all, philosophy involves the generation of ingenious cases about which philosophers have relatively strong and consistent intuitions; such intuitions are a significant source of evidence for philosophical analysis.

Of late this picture has come under attack. Some say 'intuition' is nothing more than a pompous word for 'belief', and that our beliefs are not—simply because they are our beliefs—a source of philosophical evidence. Some observe that intuitions are supposed to have various hallmarks—intuitions are supposed to have a particular phenomenology or issue simply from insight into conceptual structure; they complain that they are unaware of any such phenomenology and dubious about conceptual structure. Some say that since intuitions vary with the culture of their possessors, their usefulness as evidential fodder is compromised or worse.

In this chapter, I defend a version of the picture most of us used to find self-evident. That picture, I think, reflects something important about philosophy and one of the reasons it is worthwhile doing it. My plan is this. I first say what I take intuitions to be. I then say something about the idea that philosophical analysis involves (but is not exhausted by) conceptual analysis. I think there is something to this idea—something, I hasten to add, that even a Quinean could endorse. I will point out how intuitions,
understood in the way I propose to understand them, obviously provide evidence for conceptual, and thus philosophical, analysis. I then compare the view I sketch with that of Herman Cappelen, who is no friend of the idea that philosophy needs intuitions.¹ There is, I think, not all that much distance between the view I outline here (and the views of many others who think that intuitions are philosophical evidence) and Cappelen's view. Some of the difference between Cappelen and the advocates of intuition is merely verbal. There may, however, be at least one substantive difference between Cappelen and me, one that has to do with what we can reasonably expect philosophical analysis to deliver.

I

I won't try to define 'philosophical analysis'. But it is the sort of thing that philosophers are doing when they offer or criticize what are meant to be illuminating accounts of the conditions under which objects have a property or relation. It's the sort of thing you find when the philosopher, after 20 or so pages of Chisholming away at various definitions triumphantly displays something of the form of

(K) S knows that p iff….

and declares the Gettier problem solved.

A case, as I shall use the term, is a description of a(n apparently) possible situation. Intuitions are things that are made manifest by strong,
relatively stable inclinations to apply something predicative—a phrase or a concept—to something as described in the case.

This doesn't yet tell us what intuitions are, but it does, I think, have implications about what they are not. There is no need for an intuition to involve distinctive phenomenology, for example, since the strong and stable inclinations that manifest them generally do not. Intuitions presumably don't correspond to spontaneous or "snap" judgments, at least not to ones that are immediately accessible to consciousness: Confronted with a putative counter-example to an analysis of (say) \( x \) acts freely in \( F'ing \), I may at first not know what to say about it, in part because I "go back and forth" between an inclination to think the case is a case of free action and an inclination to say it is not. Indeed, we have all found on occasion that our intuitions are at war with one another: I may after reflection have a strong inclination to say that something is a case of free action (perhaps in part because it so clearly patterns with paradigms of free action) as well as a strong inclination to say that the case is not such (perhaps because it has elements that I am committed to saying are incompatible with free agency).

So what, exactly, are intuitions? There are, I think, two primary possibilities: they are psychological states—judgments or inclinations to judge—focused on propositional contents, or they are the contents of some such states. The dominant use of 'intuition', I think, identifies them with judgments about possible cases, so that (for example) my intuition about Goldman's barn case is either my making a particular judgment about it, or is the content of that judgment. Because conflicting intuitions need not issue in judgments, I don't think this is the best way to use the term. Better, it

\[ ^{2} I \text{ assume that the norm is that such inclinations are manifestations of intuitions.} \]

\[ ^{3} \text{ The case is in Goldman 1976; it's presented below in section IV.} \]
seems to me, to identify intuitions with either strong and stable inclinations to make a judgment about a case, or with the content of the judgment one is thus inclined to make. I will be non-committal about the content of the relevant judgments, though I am inclined to endorse the idea that, for example, the content of the intuition that Alvin Goldman is focused on, when he presents the case of Henry driving about fake barn country, is something like

\[ p_1: \text{It is ('metaphysically') possible that someone be as Henry is in [here insert Goldman's description of the case] but not know that he is looking at a barn.} \]

But nothing I will say turns on niceties about the content of an intuition. Goldman's intuition is thus either his strong and stable inclination to judge \( p_1 \), or it's the content of that potential judgment. Which one is it?

II

Philosophers who toil at finding biconditionals like (K) often call what they are up to conceptual analysis. I take it that those who use this monicker think that a successful philosophical analysis would among other things tell us something not just about a property or relation but about our concept of it. The idea, I take it, is that a philosopher who offered

\[(K') \text{Knowledge is reliably generated true belief}\]

\[\text{Here I follow Malmgren 2011.}\]
\[\text{5 along with something that fixed the meaning of 'reliably generated'}\]
as an analysis or philosophical account means to be doing two things: (1) she's telling us that the relation of knowledge is instantiated just if the properties and relations mentioned on the right side of (K') are instantiated in the right way; (2) she's also telling us that the concepts of being reliably generated, being true, and being a belief are "part of", or "help constitute" our concept of knowledge. The idea, that is, is that when philosophical analysis is successful, it tells us something about "conceptual structure". I hereby dub this idea CIA.

CIA needs elaboration. It is not always clear what philosophers have in mind when they speak of concepts, and it is certainly not clear what conceptual structure is supposed to be. And it is not totally clear why an analysis of, say, the concept of knowledge – which one would think is something that is in some broad sense psychological – would be helpful to someone who was looking for illumination about the relation knowledge.

On any way of understanding the philosopher's talk of concepts, concepts have a semantics: they (or their applications) can sensibly be said to be true or false of objects. Some see concepts as in some sense "internal" and thus idiosyncratic, others as in some sense "external" and common property. On the first view, concepts are categories: enduring psychological structures that are involved in classification, are in some way involved in occurrent beliefs and memories, and are, in language users, in some important way connected with the meanings of the words we use to form their canonical names.6 Categories are naturally thought of as idiosyncratic to their possessor, as they are structures naturally individuated

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6 By this last I mean, for instance, that there is an intimate relation between the meaning of my word 'cat' and my concept cat.
in terms of knowledge and perceptual abilities that vary across individuals. Others think of concepts as shared by different individuals, so that, for example, normal adult humans have the same concepts of \textit{(physical) object} and \textit{agent} and normal English speakers express the same concept with the words 'accident' and 'mistake'. If you think of word meanings as one kind of concept and think that members of a single language community typically mean the same thing when they use everyday vocabulary items, you will probably be partial to this view.

If CIA is part of a proposal about how to best understand philosophical practice, we should take the concepts philosophers analyze to be shared ones. For whatever the target of such analysis may be it is something that is public in the banal sense that when different philosophers try to give an account of knowledge, or reasons for action, or reference, or whatever, they presuppose that they are all trying to give an account of the \textit{same} thing. I infer this last bit from the way in which (what is usually identified as) philosophical analysis proceeds. If you look at arguments over cases and over what our intuitions about them tell us, it is striking that we do not argue from intuitions --that is, from judgments about cases --that we do not take to be widely shared; the weight we are willing to assign to an intuition seems to be a function, not of how strong our own inclinations are, but of how widely the intuition is shared. And one just doesn't see philosophers retreating, when their intuitions are disputed, by saying that they are only trying to give an account of their own concepts. We all agree that if A's analysis of knowledge is correct and B's intuitions conflict with it, B's intuitions are messed up, even if they accurately reflect his idiosyncratic concept of knowledge.
Suppose this much is accepted. What, exactly, is the conceptual structure that analysis illuminates? What is it, for p's being true to be "part of the concept" of my knowing p?

Well, we are thinking of a concept as something that we first and foremost share with others. Many, perhaps most, of our concepts are acquired from others: We learn the rudiments of concept application from others; we work with them to decide how to apply concepts in difficult cases; when differences over application are manifest, we argue and negotiate. Even when a concept (apparently) has an innate basis—as, presumably, the concepts object and actor do—their contours are elaborated through social interaction.

Having a concept is in part a matter of being connected to a social network, a group of people who make use of the concept in particular ways, who recognize one another as using the same concept, and who typically share presuppositions about how the concept is to be applied, even in novel cases. To say that we share such presuppositions is to say, roughly, that the dispositions we have to apply the concept are in synch: For a broad range of cases, we are all (for the most part) disposed to apply the concept in those cases, we are all (for the most part) disposed to behave as if we expect that others (for the most part) will so apply the concept in those cases, we are (for the most part) disposed to behave as if we all (for the most part) expect that others will (...) expect that we (...) will so apply the concept, and so

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7 Part of having a concept is having a sense of the range of ways in which it can be applied, and thus having a sense of how far someone's use of a concept can diverge from one's own and still be a use of that concept.
on. These presuppositions and the behavior that manifests them make significant contributions to what our concepts are true of, though they do not by themselves determine reference: at the very least, we need to combine them with our relations to our environment and historical and broadly social facts about linguistic practice before we have something that might determine reference.

Some of these presuppositions are more or less readily available to consciousness. Some may even qualify as mutual knowledge: not only do we pretty much all know that brothers are siblings, we all pretty much know that all know this, that all expect that we all know this, and so on. But many such presuppositions are not articulated: they have not been voiced, nor have they been thought explicitly, nor are they recorded subpersonally in some algorithmic form, nor does passing reflection give easy access to formulae which spell them out. And among such presuppositions, many can't be said to be known or even objects of belief. Take Austin's shopworn but nice examples from 'A Plea for Excuses' that illustrate the difference between doing something by mistake and doing it accidentally. Do all or even most competent speakers know, before they read Austin's footnote, that someone who knows what it is to do something by accident expects anyone (who knows what accidental action is) to know that in the case in which the donkey Austin aims at moves and he thus shoots the neighbor's donkey, it was done by accident, not by mistake?

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8 Obviously, in speaking of what users of a concept mutually presuppose, I have in mind something like what would be "common ground" among users in Robert Stalnaker's sense of common ground—see, for example, Stalnaker 2002.

There are delicate issues here about members of a community who possess a concept but are in some way deviant—people who (to borrow an example from Tyler Burge) have the concept sofa but think that sofas are not furniture but religious paraphernalia. For the moment I'm going to ignore such issues.
I would say no, and not just because most people are unfamiliar with the Austin example. Most people who have the concepts of acting by mistake and acting accidentally have not thought very hard about them. They have picked up the concepts by seeing them applied in various cases, acquiring dispositions that more or less match those of everyone else, at least in a broad range of everyday cases. They have stable inclinations to apply the terms, ones that overlap with those of others, but they have not articulated those inclinations to themselves or to others. When the competent speaker reads the footnote and judges this one's by mistake, that one's by accident, she is not applying an explicit rule from which the judgment is an easy consequence. She is not doing something that she had a prior expectation that she (or anyone else) would do; neither did she have prior knowledge from which such an expectation is an easy consequence. This is not to say that she didn't know what it is to do something by mistake or by accident; it is rather to say that to have that kind of knowledge does not require very much in the way of conceptual articulation.

What is surprising is that while most people cannot articulate the difference between mistake and accident, almost everyone immediately 'gets' the example and makes the judgments about them Austin expects. There is presumably something about our practice of labeling things as mistakes or accidents, something in the presuppositions about accidents and mistakes that are shared by those who have the concepts accident and mistake, that leads to convergence here –there is some set of properties and relations, or some degree of some magnitude, or something else made manifest in the examples, to which our classifications are sensitive, and

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9 As Austin observes, many people will say that they are the same thing.
which explains our convergence. When this sort of thing is true of a concept, say that the concept has *implicit content*.

Implicit content is implicit, and it needs to be articulated. Though pretty much everyone agrees in their judgments about Austin's cases, it is actually pretty difficult to project from the cases to an account of the difference. Such an articulation would involve claims along the lines of ones like

(A) We take such and such properties to suffice for something to fall under the concept *accident*

We take such and such properties to be are necessary for something to fall under the concept *mistake*,

where the properties in question are ones, sensitivity to which explains our converging judgments. Since implicit content is what sparks application, and our common patterns of application can be erroneous, articulations of such content need to be made in this form, though of course it will often turn out that something stronger can be said, something along the lines of

(A') Such and such properties suffice for something to be an accident

Such and such properties are necessary for something to be a mistake.

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10 *Some* of what I have characterized as implicit content is already articulated in the minds of most speakers—that something falls under the concept *brother* only if it is mail is an example. Not much of the articulated content of a concept will be of philosophical interest.
As I see it, those who think that philosophical analysis involves uncovering conceptual structure think such analysis aims at uncovering implicit conceptual structure in the sense I've been trying to elucidate. Their hope is to come up with truths that look like the claims in (A); they suspect that often enough those truths will lead to truths like those in (A').

III

It seems to me obvious that many philosophers have understood what they were up to as conceptual analysis in more or less the sense I have been trying to isolate. Certainly Austin and other ordinary language philosophers did. Austin counsels us that at least sometimes in philosophy

…we are to proceed from "ordinary language", that is, by examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it.¹¹

…ordinary language … embodies … something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely…the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. …If a distinction works well for practical purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary. …[Everyday] experience has ..not been fed from the

¹¹ Austin (1957), 7.
resources of the microscope and its successors….superstition and error and fantasy of all kinds do become incorporated in ordinary language…(only, when they do, why should we not detect it?). Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word.\textsuperscript{12}

Austin is suggesting here that philosophy at least begins by understanding the conceptual connections and distinctions that are explicit and implicit in the "experience and acumen of many generations", which is what I just suggested we take to be the structure of a shared concept. I would have thought that it was obvious that a good many philosophers --Plato and Moore strike me as good examples –would recognize themselves as engaged in cognate investigations.

I imagine that some will say that this a misleading picture of philosophical analysis. When, for example, Alvin Goldman reasons about the case of Henry in fake barn country, he reasons quite explicitly to an account of knowledge, not to an account of our concept of knowledge. No matter what Austin might say, he is after an account of the difference between a mistake and an accident, not an account of the difference between our concepts of these. Save when they are doing some part of philosophy of mind concerned with concepts or representations, philosophers are concerned with analyzing properties not concepts of properties.

To this, I respond that the suggestion was not that philosophical analysis was concerned solely with concepts and their structure. Of course

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 12.
we are as much interested in the properties and relations our concepts are
concepts of as we are in the concepts themselves.

One might counter that dragging concepts into an account of
philosophical practice only obfuscates it. A philosophical account of, say,
knowledge or free action aspires to (something like) a true, illuminating, and
(possibly) necessary account of what is necessary and sufficient for someone
to know p or to act freely in doing such and such. "Applying the concept of
knowledge to cases" is nothing more or less than thinking about what's
necessary or sufficient for knowledge. The idea that we are thinking about
our concepts when we are thinking about knowledge is about as plausible, it
might be said, as the idea that we are looking at a mental image when we are
looking at a barn.

One reason to think that this response is too hasty is that it ignores the
possibility –a possibility that is often a probability –that philosophical
analysis may be a worthwhile enterprise in cases in which there is no
property for the analysis to be an analysis of; all there is for us to analyze in
many cases of philosophical interest is our concepts.

Take free action as an example. Some philosophers tell us that to act
freely would be to perform an act, the performance of which was not
determined by conditions over which one has no control. Others tell us that
to act freely is, roughly put, to perform an act such that one could have
decided not to perform it (and would not have performed it, had one so
decided). Yet other accounts are on offer. There is no consensus amongst
philosophers –or amongst non-philosophers, for that matter –about which of
these accounts of free action we should endorse. This is in good part
because all of the accounts have –I hope I will be allowed to put it this way –
considerable intuitive appeal. Each of them invokes elements that are more
or less central to the way we think about free action, elements that we are loathe to write out of our way of thinking of it.

Why should we think that when we use the phrase 'free action' in speech or token it in thought, it is determinate that we are picking out the property isolated by one as opposed to another of these candidate analyses of free action? I do not ask this rhetorically. I am open to being convinced that we do determinately mean something more or less co-intensive with one of these analyses, or with one that no one has been clever enough to hit upon yet. But it seems obvious that: (a) we are owed an argument for this, given that our intuitions about free action are divided and wobbly; (b) it is not at all implausible that 'free action' does not determinately denote; (c) if it does not, then all those interested in philosophical problems linked to the notion of freedom can do is to describe the varying strands in our concept of free action and make recommendations, based on the interests we do or might have, as to how we might eliminate the vagueness of the concept.\(^\text{13}\)

I do not say that all or even most of the notions philosophy investigates suffer from the kind of indeterminacy I've suggested may infect the notion of free action. But I do say that it is very probable that some, and not improbable that many, do.\(^\text{14}\)

There is a somewhat different sort of indeterminacy from which many notions of philosophical interest arguably suffer, one that gives another

\(^\text{13}\) I should point out that point I am making does not depend on what account of vagueness we adopt. The epistemicist about vagueness, for example, will say that if 'acts freely' is vague in the way I have suggested it might be, then while there is a fact about what property the phrase picks out, it is unknowable what that property is. But if it \textit{is} unknowable, there doesn't seem to be much of interest for philosophers concerned with free action to do, beyond conceptual delineation and normative recommendations.

\(^\text{14}\) Nor do I say I am the first person to suggest that this is so. See, for example, Unger (1984).
reason to interpret philosophical analysis as at least in part a kind of conceptual analysis.

Consider my dog, who is capable of rudimentary thought. She can, for example, think that I have thrown a ball. Many such thoughts are presumably realized by mental structures that deserve to be called concepts – structures that are used in categorization, that are invoked in memory, are implicated in the planning and rudimentary reasoning the dog engages in, and so forth. Consider, now, the project of determining the extension (or possible worlds intension) of the canine ball-concept that helps realize the dog's belief that I just threw a ball. The project is not obviously absurd, and might even be worth contemplating, if only because it raises interesting questions about interpretation and intensionality. What is absurd is the suggestion that it is even close to determinate, for every ballish x, whether the dog's concept is true of x. Surely my Sheltie's dispositions to behavior and her "knowledge of the world" support neither the claim that the concept mobilized when she thinks I threw a ball is true of a football the size of a car, nor the claim that the concept is false of such.

An investigation into the semantics of Sheltie thought is an investigation in semantics, and thus an investigation into what properties dogs are thinking about, in some sense of 'property'. But the properties in question are partial. And to get a grip on the way in which they are partial, we have no choice but to look at the structure of the canine concept and its deployment. Why exactly should we think that it is any different when it comes to the analysis of human thought? It is a banal observation indeed that we have not anticipated all of the cases in which we might be puzzled as to whether a particular word or concept applies. It is a less banal, but no less correct, observation that our dispositions, world knowledge, and
environmental relations do not come close to determining what our reactions to novel cases will or should be.\textsuperscript{15} It is implausible, in my opinion, that an appeal to some metric of naturalness will erase very much of the indeterminacy.

Like the dog's, our thoughts are partial in the sense that it is very often a vague matter whether their predicative elements are true or false of the things we are thinking about –there is either no fact of the matter, or there might as well be no fact, since the facts are unknowable. As in the case of Sheltie semantics, to get a grip on what we are thinking, we have no choice but to look at the structure of our concepts and their deployment. If we as philosophers are interested in what we are thinking, when we think about knowledge, freedom, or the good, we have no choice but to pay as much attention to our common conceptual structure as to the properties that structure might be reaching towards.

IV

Intuitions are supposed to provide evidence for philosophical analysis. Insofar as one of the targets of such analysis is implicit or explicit conceptual structure, surely they do. When there is a widespread intuition about a case, this is sometimes best explained by supposing that that intuition reflects such structure. When we so explain the intuition, the intuition has the status of evidence for the explanation we give.

A concrete example is Goldman's discussion of Henry, who has unknowingly driven into an area where there are many fake barns and who,

\footnote{For a budget of examples see Wilson (1980), (2006).}
looking at a real barn, thinks that it is a barn. Goldman observes that if we are only told that Henry is driving around Pennsylvania, sees a barn and thinks 'that's a barn', we will be inclined to say he knows that he sees a barn; if we are also told about the fake barns, we are inclined to say that in such a case, Henry doesn't know that he is looking at a barn.

Goldman considers various accounts of knowledge that validate the intuition and settles on one of them, on which knowing $p$ requires that one's belief that $p$ be reliable in a particular way— the knower must be able to discriminate the actual state of affairs $p$ from various relevant possible alternatives. Goldman explicitly argues for this proposal by observing that our "inclinations" to make judgments about various cases are correlated with whether the case is described in such a way as to presuppose that Henry is unable to discriminate the area's fake barns from its real barns:

A person knows that $p$…only if the actual state of affairs in which $p$ is true is distinguishable or discriminable by him from a relevant possible state of affairs in which $p$ is false. …In the original description of the barn case [Case C, call it, where there is no mention of fake barns] there is no hint of any relevant possible state of affairs in which the object in question is not a barn but is indistinguishable (by Henry) from the actual state of affairs. Hence, we are initially inclined to say that Henry knows. Given that the district Henry has entered is full of barn facsimiles, there is a relevant alternative …state of affairs …[that] is indistinguishable by Henry from the actual state

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16 Goldman (1976).
of affairs…. So, once apprised of the facsimiles in the district [in Case C'], we are inclined to deny that Henry knows.\textsuperscript{17}

Call the property of Henry's belief that we sense to be lacking in the full blown case \textit{reliability}. Part of the argument here pretty clearly involves premises like:

1. We have a stable and strong inclination to say that Henry's barn belief is knowledge, when given case C, and a stable and strong inclination to say that Henry's barn belief isn't knowledge when given case C'.

2. In case C, 'there is no hint' that Henry's belief is not reliable; in case C', there is a suggestion that it is not.

If we assume, as surely Goldman is assuming, something along the lines of

3. Nothing else about the cases is relevant to explaining the difference in our inclinations towards C and C'

we are in a position to explain 1 with:

4. Our stable and strong inclinations about cases like Henry's and about whether a belief is knowledge are sensitive to whether or not it appears to us that the belief is reliable.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, 774.
But of course this pattern of explanation is one in which we explain the existence of an intuition—that is, we explain (1)—with a hypothesis about conceptual structure. If we add to (4) something else that Goldman is presumably assuming

5. When our judgments about whether something is F are sensitive to whether it is G, that is a reason, all else being equal, to think that Fs are Gs.

we are in a position to conclude that we have reason to think that knowledge requires reliability.

It seems to me that many passages in analytic philosophy of the last 50 or so years, in which philosophers make points by appeal to examples, should be understood in much the way I'm proposing that this passage should.

V

I want at this point to compare my take on the role of intuition in philosophy with Herman Cappelen's. Cappelen is no friend of the idea that intuitions have a role in philosophy, and I am. But the distance between our views is not so great, and it is, I think, illuminating to see exactly what it is.

Acknowledging that there are different accounts of the nature and role of intuition, Cappelen focuses on the view that

A. Intuitions are mental states:
1. with propositional content, either *sui generis* states ("seemings") or beliefs with a particular etiology;
2. which have a distinctive phenomenology;
3. that are based solely on conceptual competence;
4. and that have a special evidential status – they are in some sense "rock bottom" and need no justification.

B. Analytic philosophers rely on intuitions so characterized for evidence (at least as a source of evidence).

Cappelen is inclined to dismiss the idea that there is a distinctive phenomenology that accompanies what philosophers are voicing when they express intuitions, observing that he is unaware of any such funny feelings when he reads the work of Gettier, Goldman, or Kripke. I, too, am an intuition zombie. Let us agree to strike A.2 from the characterization of intuition; call the resulting job description for intuitions *I*.

Cappelen for the most part attacks views on which intuitions are the contents of beliefs that we give voice to when confronted with philosophical cases. For example, in discussing Goldman's barn example, Cappelen identifies the putative intuitions that Goldman would describe himself as invoking as consisting in 'two claims':

C1: In the first scenario [when fakes are not mentioned], Henry does know.
C2: In the second scenario, Henry does not know.\textsuperscript{18}

On this interpretation, intuitions are beliefs \textit{cum} contents of judgments about cases. It is not hard to show that these don't fit the job description I: As Cappelen argues, C1 and C2 not candidates for "rock bottom" evidential status, and Goldman is not well understood as thinking otherwise.

All this marks a difference between Cappelen and me, but at least some of the difference is merely verbal. I do not identify intuitions with judgments about cases nor with the contents of such judgments. Intuitions are, rather, certain psychological facts that often result in our making judgments with the relevant contents. I gave reason for thinking of intuitions in this way at the beginning of the paper: a single person's intuitions are often in conflict; we don't want to say that just because someone has conflicting intuitions, they have inconsistent beliefs.

Do the psychological facts with which I say we should identify intuitions have "rock bottom" evidential status? Well, frankly, I'm not a fan of talking that way about any evidence, being myself something of a fan of Quine's 'Two Dogmas'. But surely such facts have, for the person whose psychology they are facts about, pretty secure evidential status. You could probably convince me –with a lot of work –that I don't have a stable and strong inclination to judge that Henry doesn't know in the second scenario, just as the doctor in an old example of Keith Lehrer's manages to convince a patient that a state she reports as a pain isn't really a pain but a itch. But this doesn't mean that my knowledge about my inclinations isn't evidentially basic for me in an important sense.

\textsuperscript{18} Cappelen (2012), 171-2.
This difference is related to a difference between Cappelen and me about what is going on in passages like the one from Goldman, discussed in the last section. I see the passage as involving, among other things, an abductive inference; Cappelen does not. Cappelen's main complaint about interpreting it as I do is that

in an abductive inference with $c$ as the *explanandum* and $T$ as the *explanans*, the question of whether $c$ is the case is typically not under discussion.\(^{19}\)

The point is well taken. But surely what we should conclude is not that the relevant passages are not best reconstructed as abductive arguments. Rather, we should conclude that the *explanandum* of the argument is the fact that the philosopher—and (the philosopher assumes) most other philosophers—are strongly and stably inclined to make the relevant judgment. *That* is not up for debate; I'm sure Cappelen would not disagree.

Are intuitions in my sense thereof "based solely on conceptual competence"? Well, again, as a fan of Quine I am no fan of this way of talking. And, in any case, as I have characterized intuitions they may be the result of any number of things, including contingent, collateral knowledge about the property a case is supposed to focus us on. This is one reason why, in my reconstruction of Goldman's argument, the final premise—the one that gets us from facts about concepts to ones about properties—is hedged with a *ceteris paribus* clause. Intuitions are the result of our applying our concepts to descriptions, without "doing empirical

\(^{19}\) *ibid.*
investigation". As things stand, they are a way to get some evidence about what we are and are not sensitive to, in applying a concept. I suppose I agree with Cappelen that saying that intuitions are "based solely on conceptual competence" is a bad way of describing them. It doesn't follow that they aren't a source of evidence for what I called above conceptual structure.

Cappelen and I don't disagree that there are intuitions, characterized as I have been characterizing them. We do seem to disagree about their role in philosophical argumentation, as well as about what it is that philosophical analysis is and should be trying to do.

The disagreement is not, I think, really about the range of things that play an evidential role in philosophy. Cappelen thinks that just about anything might play an evidential role in philosophy; he believes, I think, that the idea that intuitions have a distinguished role in philosophical evidence badly –very badly--overestimates their importance. I agree that just about anything can play an evidential role in philosophy, and that a great deal of what is evidence in philosophy comes not from gazing at our inner omphalos, but from the sciences.

I think where Cappelen I differ most fundamentally is about what philosophers are doing, when they try to give accounts of things like knowledge or free action. Cappelen's view, I think, is that they are simply trying to say something illuminating about properties and relations, and that our concepts of these properties and relations are of no particular philosophical interest. Myself, I think we have no choice in philosophically interesting cases than to proceed cautiously, open to the possibility that there are no properties or relations that our words and concepts are directed on – not because those concepts are as empty of content as the concept
phlogiston, but because they are often massively partial or painfully indeterminate. Since this is generally an open possibility, and surely sometimes how things in fact are, philosophical analysis has to be conceptual analysis, for often there is nothing else for it to be.

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